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Collective Bargaining, Mutuality, 
and Workers Participation in 
Management 
An International Analysis 
Milton Derber 
Since the end of World War II, worker participation in 
management has expanded in varying degrees, in différent forms, 
and at différent levels. In West Europe bot h collective bargaining 
and mutualism hâve expanded dramatically and workers par-
ticipation in management seems destined to advance. In Britain 
and North America the adversary System of collective bargaining 
has predominated. Mutualistic schemes hâve been in the small 
minority. The attitudinal climate has not been conducive to con-
sensus thinking in industrial relations. 
TWO BASIC APPROACHES 
Efforts to advance workers participation in management hâve taken 
two main approaches.1 One, exemplified by collective bargaining, is adver-
sary in nature; the other, as expressed in autonomous work groups, pro-
ducers' coopération and (within limits) codetermination, is mutualistic or 
consensual. The adversary concept, as used hère, is not the polar contrast to 
the mutualistic. It does not dénote a struggle in which one of the parties is to 
be vanquished and eliminated. Nor does it preclude coopération among the 
adversaries. Some writers hâve referred to it as "antagonistic 
collaboration". It might, more appropriately, be labeled "compétitive col-
laboration". It is analogous to the political Systems of most modem 
démocratie societies inasmuch as it recognizes opposing interests over par-
ticular issues but assumes agreement on the underlying législative and 
• DERBER, Milton, Professor, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University 
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1 The knowledgeable reader will fïnd little novelty in this dichotomy. Most of the ideas 
expressed in this introductory section are contained in contemporary writings. 
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judicial procédures through which conflicts over interests or rights may be 
peaceably resolved. Although the mutualistic approach is based on the 
achievement of consensus, it also recognizes individual or group dif-
férences. However, it assumes that when issues arise the parties involved 
will subordinate their différences in a search for a common solution that 
will maximize the benefits for the total unit. 
Let us examine the différences between the two approaches in 
somewhat more détail. 
The collective bargaining approach is premised on the principle of col-
lective organization, that employées and managers will participate in 
management decision-making through formai organizations, typically a 
trade union or a management unit. Individuals and informai groups who at-
tempt to deviate from the position of représentative organizations are 
discouraged and, in extrême cases, outlawed. The mutualistic approach, in 
contrast, emphasizes the rôle of the individual within the enterprise, acting 
as a member of a team or family. To the extent that functional rôles pro-
duce "sides" or opposing interests, it seeks to downplay or soften the 
groupings and to emphasize individual interests in the whole. 
The collective bargaining approach assumes that the collective 
organizations of employées and managers are independent of each other to 
the extent that each feels free to advocate and press for opposing interests in 
the bargaining process. The management-dominated union and the union-
intimidated management can hardly engage in genuine collective bargain-
ing. Collective bargaining, historically, has attached considérable impor-
tance to the rôle of "outsiders'', particularly on the union side, because the 
outside link is expected to add appréciable information, expertise, and 
bargaining power to the local organization. The mutualistic approach de-
emphasizes separate and competing groups. It reflects, further, a préférence 
for minimizing the rôle of "outsiders" in enterprise decision-making. Thus 
outside union représentatives appointed to boards of directors are often ex-
pected to divest themselves of union positions and to act as individuals 
rather than représentatives. 
The collective bargaining approach attaches great importance to the 
distribution and exercise of power between unions and management. It is 
generally assumed that collective bargaining works best when there is an ap-
proximate balance of power. If power is disproportionate, it is assumed that 
the stronger party will restrain its exercise of power to some degree, that is 
the union will not press for gains beyond the capacity of the enterprise to 
survive as an économie unit and the employer will not seek to destroy the 
union as the workers' représentative. The mutualistic approach tends to by-
pass the power concept. It assumes that différences in the decision-making 
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process will be resolved by discussion, persuasion, and rational judgment 
rather than pressure. Since the participants share common interests, there is 
no reason for one group to seek to overpower the others. 
The collective bargaining approach accepts overt conflict in the form 
of strikes and lockouts as a regrettable but often unavoidable last step in the 
resolution of différences over interests. While alternatives to the work stop-
pages may be used for certain kinds of issues (e.g., private or public arbitra-
tion, labor courts, or a législative body), the ultimate resort to self-help re-
mains a major component of the System. The mutualistic approach rejects 
overt conflict. It assumes that ail décisions can be made in a peaceful and 
harmonious way. If conflict breaks out, it is a sign of disorder, of the mal-
functioning of the System. 
Finally, the collective bargaining approach assumes the continuation of 
a functional division between "management** and "employées". Although 
the scope of bargaining has grown over the years, union leaders (with some 
exceptions) hâve been reluctant to share responsibility for decision-making 
in areas that do not directly affect pay, fringe benefits, hours of work, man-
ning, contracting out, and other terms and conditions of employment. Nor 
hâve they evidenced a will to assume the rôles and functions of manage-
ment.2 In turn, management has emphasized its "right to manage" and has 
strongly resisted union demands for a greater voice in determining 
managerial décisions. The mutualistic approach, on the contrary, has en-
couraged employée participation in decision-making areas that hâve tradi-
tionally been exclusively management, notably productive efficiency, 
absenteeism and waste, and investment or plant location policies. It has not 
only added employées to decision-making units but, in some cases, has 
given employée représentatives managerial rôles and altered the duties of 
management positions. Supervisors are no longer "bosses" but group 
leaders or coordinators or even only advisors. 
VARIATIONS IN PATTERNS 
Thèse two basic approaches to worker participation in management are 
often found functioning separately from each other in "pure" terms. In the 
United States and Britain, and in other Systems flowing from them, the 
adversary model generally prevails in plants and industries where employées 
are unionized. In the self-management System of Yugoslavia, in the kibbut-
2 This is particularly true in the United States and Canada. 
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zim of Israël, and in producers coopératives of a number of countries, the 
mutualistic model has been adopted. But there are also examples of 
Systems, particularly in the former category, where the two approaches co-
exist in the same industry or enterprise. And there are certain behavioral ap-
proaches where the adversary and mutualistic concepts are blended. For ex-
ample, in West Germany collective bargaining occurs mainly outside of the 
enterprise — at the industry-wide or régional level — while a more or less 
mutualistic approach applies at the enterprise level. The unions in récent 
years hâve become much more active at the plant level but the works coun-
cils are chosen by ail the employées (non-union as well as union), council 
members must be employées, and they are prohibited by law from calling a 
strike. A form of bargaining does occur on a variety of employment condi-
tions and rules, but, absent the right to strike, it is likely to be more discus-
sional than adversarial in character. The supervisory boards include outside 
représentatives for workers as well as shareholders but they, reportedly, do 
not often interact in a collective bargaining manner. 
In Japan the bargaining and mutualistic functions appear to be similar-
ly distributed. The basic wage and hour décisions are essentially determined 
through a militant adversary approach at the national level (the annual 
Spring "shunto") although the agreements are reached on an individual 
enterprise basis. Other employment and management décisions are made 
within the enterprises through a largely consensual process. As in West Ger-
many, there are some indications that the bargaining approach is assuming 
more importance in the enterprise, but in comparison with Anglo-American 
expérience, the shift is minor. 
In Sweden and Norway the bargaining/mutualism pattern has a 
somewhat différent configuration. Although there is a great deal of con-
sultation and collaboration between management and employée représen-
tatives, including employée représentation on the company board of direc-
tors and a joint plant committee, the dominant rule-making or decision-
making process beyond the job level is based on bargaining. The union 
organization, as distinct from the individual employées, is the focal 
employée représentative and différences between management and labor are 
resolved through taking "sides". The récent Swedish law on employée par-
ticipation in plant decision-making explicitly recognizes management and 
union interests, but reverses the traditional policy of giving priority to 
management's position by letting the union interprétation stand until a 
labor court has issued an award. At the job level, however, the widespread 
institution of semi-autonomous work groups has promoted the mutualistic 
rather than the adversary approach. Décisions about the performance of 
work are determined in a consensual manner. It is still too early to assess the 
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Swedish "blend". As the union assumes increasing responsibility for co-
determination of managerial policies beyond employment conditions, can 
the leaders effectively préserve their interest group rôle or will more 
adversarial-minded employée représentatives arise from below to challenge 
them? Given the long and impressive record of union-management coopéra-
tion in Sweden and the lengthy involvement of Swedish labor leaders in na-
tional social and économie planning and implementation, the prospects for 
success are high. If the mixed pattern does not work effectively, however, it 
is not likely to do so in other western démocratie societies where cultural 
conditions are much more heterogeneous and attitudes are much less 
favorable to collaboration. 
Although collective bargaining prédominâtes as an adversary System in 
the United States and Canada, there hâve been a minority of situations in 
which the consensual approach has been linked to the bargaining approach. 
One well-known example is the Scanlon Plan which sets up committees 
separate from the collective bargaining contract to receive, discuss and 
evaluate employée suggestions on how to improve productivity and to 
reduce waste. Cost savings are distributed to ail employées on the basis of 
an agreed-upon formula. Despite the fact that the Scanlon committees are 
the resuit of union-management negotiations, they typically function on a 
consensual basis rather than as an adversary proceeding. Other examples 
will be discussed below. 
In the Israeli kibbutzim and some producers coopératives it is not un-
common for "hired workers" to be employed side by side with the "owner-
workers". The wages and conditions of the "hired workers" may be deter-
mined through national collective bargaining while those of the "owner-
workers" are determined through local consensual procédures. Although 
ideologically disturbing, and the subject of lengthy debate within the kib-
butz movement, this blend has proved to be operational for a number of 
décades. Israël also provides examples of union-owned enterprises (e.g., 
Koor, the large industrial company owned and run by the Histadrut) in 
which bargaining over employment terms takes place between a union-
appointed management board and a union representing the employées of 
the company. 
THE WALTON-McKERSIE ANALYSIS 
Thèse mixed patterns suggest the desirability of a brief examination of 
Walton and McKersie's widely read book, A Behavioral Theory of Labor 
Negotiations (1965).3 In this work the collective bargaining process is 
3 WALTON, R.E., and R.B., McKERSIE, A Behavorial Theory of Labor Negotia-
tions; An Analysis of a Social Interaction System. New-York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc, 1965, 437 pp. 
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analyzed in terms of four-processes two of which contain a number of the 
characteristics that I hâve included in the bargaining and mutualistic ap-
proaches. One sub-process, which they call distributive bargaining, is essen-
tially adversary in nature. They describe it in game-theory terms as a fixed-
sum game in which the gains of one side represent a loss to the other. 
Distributive bargaining occurs principally over pay issues although it can 
apply to ail the other issues in collective agreements. A second sub-process, 
integrative bargaining, is problem-rather than issue-oriented; it is described 
as a variable-sum game in which both parties can achieve gains. Hence it is 
mutualistic in spirit rather than adversary. According to Walton and 
McKersie this type of negotiations applies mainly to non-money subjects, 
particularly matters of job security. 
In practice, Walton and McKersie observe, the bargaining agenda is 
often comprised of mixed items. The mixed agenda has both distributive 
and integrative potential and its outcome will dépend upon "the orientation 
of the negotiators and their tactical approach to the agenda item".4 Since 
the two "pure" sub-processes generally conflict, the negotiators find 
themselves in repeated dilemmas in bargaining over a mixed agenda. The 
conséquence is that each party seeks to obtain a "décent share" while 
preventing the other party from gaining "the lion's share of the game".5 
The significant feature of their analysis when applied to the subject of 
worker participation in management is that it assumes a continuing division 
of interests between management and the employées, the existence of 
"sides", a concern over power. Even the integrative sub-process is defined 
in terms of the gains to be achieved by each side rather than commonality of 
interest. The underlying relationship patterns which Walton and McKersie 
introduced in their other two sub-processes (the attitudinal structuring 
model and the intraorganizational bargaining model) lend further support 
to this interprétation. Coopération between management and unions within 
a collective bargaining framework is seen to be différent than mutualism. 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
In turn now to a more detailed analysis of the American System of col-
lective bargaining. Collective bargaining in the United States has functioned 
for the most part as an adversary system both in regard to the establishment 
4 Ibid, p. 128. See pp. 161-183 for their detailed discussion. 
5 Ibid, p. 183. 
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of the principal rules (embodied in highly detailed contracts) and the 
grievance procédure for the interprétation and implementation of the con-
tractai provisions. Although many managements and unions hâve con-
ducted their mutual affairs whithin a climate of trust and friendliness, they 
hâve been careful to assert and maintain their separate identities. The par-
ties hâve moved on a relatively limited scale in a mutualistic direction 
through the establishment of joint labor-management coopération commit-
tees or programs, designed usually for spécial purposes. Perhaps the earliest 
of thèse dealt with apprenticeship training in the building trades. More 
recently joint programs hâve been developed to deal with health and safety, 
including problems of alcoholism and drug abuse, with community 
charitable drives, energy saving, equal employment opportunity for 
minorities and women, the administration of retirement and other benefit 
funds, and recreational activities. In industries that hâve had difficulty in 
competing successfully with foreign companies (pottery and dresses, as ex-
amples) or with alternative domestic industries (e.g., glass or railroads) 
unions and employers hâve cooperated in lobbying for protective laws or 
régulations or in developing advertising and promotional campaigns. 
The record of coopération in the areas of productive efficiency, cost 
réduction, and the élimination of waste has been slight. A study by the now 
defunct National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality in 1975 
concluded that although "There is nothing in the American System of in-
dustrial relations that precludes the use of joint labor-management commit-
tees to increase productivity," they "hâve made comparatively little pro-
gress" over half a century.6 Prior to World War II the principal examples 
were found in railroads, textiles, clothing, and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (a governmental agency for electric power, flood control and 
related functions). During the War several thousand joint labor-
management productivity plant committees were established with Govern-
ment backing and guidance and many yielded fairly good results, but vir-
tually ail of thèse committees disappeared after the War ended. 
Since the War several notable examples of coopération hâve occurred 
in such diverse industries as meatpacking, steel, and longshore. The first 
(the Armour Automation Committee), involving the shutdown and reloca-
tion of a dozen obsolète plants, provided workers with relocation seniority 
rights, moving expenses, and retraining opportunities. A second was the 
Human Relations Committee set up by the United Steelworkers of America 
6 Labor-Management Productivity Committees in American Industry, May 1975, 43 
pp. 
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and the major steel companies after a costly 116-day strike in 1959 to con-
duct studies and build up mutual understanding of complex problems in-
volving wage incentives, seniority, médical care, and job classifications. A 
third example was the so-called mechanization and modernizatioe agree-
ment for the West Coast longshore industry in which restrictive or outdated 
work rules were given up by the union in return for substantial income and 
employment guarantees. Other cases include the Scalon Plans, referred to 
earlier, but thèse hâve been confined to a few hundred enterprises, mostly 
employing under 500 employées. A récent survey in an Illinois city of 
150,000 population revealed 5 unionized enterprises with joint productivity 
committees, 3 with waste réduction programs and 7 with plans to reduce 
absenteeism or turnover. 
In 1970 the fédéral government launched a national campaign to in-
crease productivity through labor-management coopération committees, 
linking to productivity the idea of improvement in the quality of working 
life as an incentive for union coopération. However, American unions hâve 
traditionally regarded the increase of productivity as a function and respon-
sibility of management; as a rule they hâve become actively involved in pro-
ductivity increase programs only to protect threatened job interests, par-
ticularly where an enterprise or industry is facing extinction. Productivity 
bargaining has been limited, and typically has involved a trade-off between 
restrictive union work rules and économie benefits for the employées. A 
number of promising programs were developed, including a community-
wide effort in the then depressed city of Jamestown, New York; an 
industry-wide plant-level program in basic steel; national joint committees 
in the retail food and trucking industries, and a variety of enterprise pro-
jects in coal mining, auto manufacture, and fabricated métal companies. 
But recently several of thèse undertakings hâve been abandoned and the im-
petus for new programs appears to hâve diminished. 
It is interesting to note that most of the American expérimentation with 
job eniargement and enrichment and with semi-autonomous work groups 
has taken place on the initiative of management in non-unionized 
establishments or with non-union employée groups in otherwise unionized 
enterprises. The development on a small scale of self-management 
establishments has also occurred outside of the collective bargaining orbit. 
Why has the American collective bargaining System produced so few 
programs of a mutualistic or quasi mutualistic nature? The National Com-
mission on Productivity and Work Quality study concluded7 that the 
7 Op. cit., p. 44. 
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answer lies in two main facts: (1) the adversary System has worked 
"reasonably well, and in most situations the parties, through mutual ac-
commodation, are able to achieve satisfactory relations''; (2) "différences 
of interest between management and union officiais and sometimes between 
the latter and their rank and file. ' ' 
It is important to note that the adversary approach is theoretically 
capable of dealing with virtually ail of the issues and problems that are dealt 
with by the mutualistic approach. Althoughlhe unions hâve tended to con-
fine their efforts to the control or régulation of job-related matters, they 
hâve gradually widened their conception of what is job-related, including 
sub-contracting and the conséquences of plant relocation décisions. Profes-
sional and quasi-professional unions, like teachers and social workers, hâve 
contended that collective bargaining encompasses the entire scope of their 
prof essional lives. 
Perhaps the chief restraint on the scope of collective bargaining arises 
from rôle différences. Basically they center on either (1) the reluctance of 
proprietary or professional management groups to share their décision 
functions with workers or unions or (2) the unwillingness of union leaders 
to risk their leadership rôle by participating in a management structure 
which might produce décisions to which the rank and file might object. 
Other factors inhibiting mutuality in the current period hâve been the 
skepticism of the Carter Administration regarding the workability of the 
joint committee approach in the productivity area and, more importantly, 
the widening gap between organized labor and big business as a resuit of the 
bitter struggle during the past few years, over the unions' proposed revi-
sions of the basic labor law. The defeat of the labor law reform campaign, 
the minimal success of labor in achieving other législative goals, and the 
frustrations of the unions in their Southern organizing campaigns hâve pro-
duced a climate that is not conducive to union-management coopération. 
The recession of the mid-seventies and the persistence of high levels of 
unemployment hâve also discouraged union participation in productivity 
programs that might reduce job opportunities for their members and, in any 
event, might hâve dislocating effect. 
EXPERIENCE WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
In Britain, Canada, and Australia, the adversary approach has general-
ly predominated as in the U.S. and coopérative or mutualistic programs 
hâve been the exception. Both in Britain and Canada the wartime joint pro-
duction consultative and advisory committees programs were continued 
196 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 2 (1980) 
after the war (in contrast to the American) but despite some interesting suc-
cess stories, the gênerai impetus gradually faded away and joint consulta-
tion was supplanted by the adversary climate of shop stewardism and collec-
tive bargaining. Joint committees of any kind hâve been rare in Australia's 
private sector although an industrial democracy movement, mainly im-
plemented in public agencies was initiated by the Government of South 
Australia in the mid-1970's and a small number of private firms were per-
suaded to experiment with consultative committees, job or work redesign, 
and semi-autonomous work groups. 
As noted above, the expérience of several west and central European 
countries, particularly West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden has differed significantly from the Anglo-American expérience. 
Very strong collective bargaining Systems, operating on adversary prin-
cipes , hâve expanded the scope of union participation in the détermination 
of employment conditions, including subjects that traditionally hâve been 
regarded as exclusively in the managerial domain, such as plant shutdowns 
and relocation. This expansion has been mainly the resuit of increased 
union involvement in the affairs of establishments in contrast to prior con-
centration on industry and area bargaining. It has been encouraged in some 
cases by législative enactment. Concurrently programs of a mutualistic or 
consensual character, such as worker directors and works councils, hâve 
grown, mainly through the adoption of législation and, somewhat ironical-
ly, often despite strong employer résistance. 
How does one explain the différence between the two sets of industrial 
relations Systems? In part they seem to be a function of relative union and 
management power in the society as a whole. Codetermination came into 
effect in the coal and steel industries of West Germany as a substitute for 
nationalization in an effort to prevent certain German employers from 
reviving their former Nazi ties or developing similar relationships in the 
future. The continuing opposition of many German employers to the 1976 
Codetermination act is indicative that the mutualistic approach does not 
corne only from voluntarism but may be imposed by the exercise of political 
power. In Sweden much of the récent expansion in worker participation in 
management at plant-level has likewise corne about through the exercise of 
political rather than bargaining power. The fate of the Meidner Plan and 
similar employée share ownership ideas, which are ultimately mutualistic in 
philosophy, will also be determined in the political arena. 
On the other hand, the extensive Scandinavian programs in semi-
autonomous work groups and work redesign hâve been the product of 
voluntaristic labor-management coopération. A shared perception of 
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underlying problems (e.g., excess absenteeism, labor turnover, and worker 
dissatisfaction with their jobs) combined with a joint willingness to experi-
ment with the redesign of the workplace and the decision-making process on 
work performance appear to hâve generated thèse mutualistic programs. 
Why the shared perceptions and willingness to experiment with respect 
to thèse problems hâve emerged on such a large scale in Scandinavia and on 
such a limited scale in North America is an intriguing question that appears 
to take us into an intricate network of historical, social, and political 
phenomena. 
In the United States and Canada unionism is a minority, although 
powerful, institution whose spread evokes strong résistance from numerous 
employers. Many white collar employées retain négative attitudes towards 
collective bargaining and they represent a growing proportion of the labor 
force. Employers hâve become increasingly sophisticated in the develop-
ment of personnel programs designed to win employée allegiance and to im-
prove employée morale. The labor force is fragmented along ethnie, racial, 
educational, and sexual lines, and class consciousness or cohésion is weak. 
As a resuit of thèse and other factors, the unions are on the défensive and 
neither they nor the great body of employers are disposed toward a col-
laborative or mutualistic approach. In the political arena, power is suffi-
ciently distributed so that législative changes desired by either side are dif-
ficult to enact. 
In Scandinavia, on the other hand, unionization and collective bargain-
ing are virtually all-encompassing, unions and managements hâve col-
laborated on a harmonious basis since the late 1930's, and labor's political 
influence is very great. A relatively small homogeneous population and a 
common body of social and économie values hâve also contributed to a 
climate of mutualism. 
The conclusion to be drawn from this very brief analysis is that, 
because of its inherently adversary nature collective bargaining in private 
enterprise Systems can lead to or function concurrently with mutualistic 
programs at various enterprise levels only if supported by a sufficient supp-
ly of political as well as économie power and, particularly, if motivated by a 
shared set of beliefs and values among the management and union parties. 
Where the values are not shared and significant power is held by a group 
hostile to the idea of mutuality, the adversary system will prevail. 
In any event, the collective bargaining approach is inherently self-
limiting in terms of worker participation in management because the 
résistance of managers will usually increase as traditional managerial func-
tions are invaded and because as union leaders assume more respon-
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sibilities, intra-party dilemmas and conflicts are created that endanger the 
organizational position of union leaders and even the survival of the 
organization. This does not preclude a widening of the scope of collective 
bargaining, especially where job interests are involved. Europe provides 
many examples and North America a smaller but growing number of union 
actions to codetermine the shutdown or relocation of a plant or major divi-
sion. Usually the involvement in the American cases cornes after the main 
décision has been made and the parties deal jointly with the conséquences of 
the move for the employées. But there is a mounting union concern with an 
earlier involvement in the décision process, especially in smaller com-
munities with limited alternative job opportunities. 
THE PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
Before concluding this discussion a brief note on the public sector 
seems fitting. The question of collective bargaining and worker participa-
tion in public management would appear on the surface to be différent from 
that in the private sector. For one thing private ownership interests are not 
involved and profitability is not ordinarily a test of performance. Market 
forces affect the supply and cost of labor but not the price of most govern-
mental services. Political factors play a major rôle in determining who fills 
the management rôle and how décisions are made. Given thèse conditions 
one might expect a much higher level of mutualism in the public sector than 
in the private sector and a lower level of adversary relations. The récent ex-
périence of most of the countries previously referred to does not support 
this expectation. It is true that for décades the Whitley Council System gave 
British public agencies a mutualistic aura not shared by the private sector. 
However during the turbulent économie period following World War II, 
nationalized industry (coal, transport, steel, etc.) has been the scène of mili-
tant collective bargaining and other parts of the public sector (éducation, 
firefighting, police) hâve reflected a similar pattern. In Scandinavia and 
Japan the adversary approach has, if anything, been more prévalent than 
the mutualistic in the public sector. And in North America the single most 
dramatic development of the past décade has been the rise of militant public 
sector unionism and collective bargaining. 
What can we infer from this expérience? It reaffirms the proposition 
noted by other writers that public ownership per se (as distinct from 
employée ownership) has little bearing on the issue of worker participation 
in management. To protect their job interests workers turn to unions and 
comparable associations in public employment as they do in private 
employment. Similarly public management shares many of the attitudes of 
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private management in carrying out managerial responsibilities and in in-
teracting with employées. Where mutualistic approaches hâve been adopted 
in the public service, they can usually be traced to the ideology of an in-
dividual or group, much as in the case of the private sector. The effec-
tiveness of such approaches appears not to differ in any noticeable way. 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Since the end of World War II, worker participation in management 
has expanded in varying degrees, in différent forms, and at différent levels. 
In West Europe both collective bargaining and mutualism hâve expanded 
dramatically and workers participation in management seems destined to 
advance. In Britain and North America the adversary System of collective 
bargaining has predominated. Mutualistic schemes hâve been in the small 
minority. The attitudinal climate has not been conducive to consensus 
thinking in industrial relations. Currently, if anything, the conditions for 
mutualism in the Anglo-American world are less favorable than they were 
two décades ago. But there are pressures for change emanating from the 
changing character of the labor force, new psychological concepts among 
professional management, and persistingly serious national économie pro-
blems of unemployment, productivity, inflation, and foreign trade. Thèse 
could conceivably change attitudes and standards. I do not expect any 
quantum jumps in the foreseeable future because collective bargaining 
seems to be a self-limiting process in respect to decision-making. 
A central question remains: how much involvement in the management 
process can union leaders achieve and maintain in a collective bargaining 
system without radically transforming the character of the System. In the 
United States during the third of a century since the end of World War II, 
the scope of union influence on management décisions at establishment 
level has grown only slightly. The principal areas of increased union in-
volvement has been the so-called fringe benefits or supplemental wage 
payments (such as private retirement and health and welfare plans), con-
tracting out of work, and occupational health and safety. In gênerai unions 
hâve not attempted to influence management décisions on production 
engineering, plant location, what products to produce, investment policy, 
sales, priées and other non-personnel matters. In some of the West Euro-
pea'n countries, particularly Sweden and West Germany, union participa-
tion in management decision-making has been more broadly conceived. 
Management is expected to supply employée représentatives with informa-
tion on virtually every aspect of the enterprise and to consult, if not actually 
bargain, with union officiais on a wide array of production and investment 
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décisions. Because this wider approach to collective bargaining is quite ré-
cent, the ultimate conséquences for the labor organizations are uncertain. 
That the American concept of worker participation in management: is more 
limited than its potential seems to be indicated by European expérience. 
That broader European concepts may fall short of realization without a 
shift from collective bargaining to a more mutualistic System based on a 
radical transformation of industrial government also seems indicated. How 
far the concepts of workers directors and employée stock ownership are car-
ried appears to dépend on the distribution of political power and the enact-
ment of facilitating législation. How far the concepts of autonomous work 
groups and self-management are carried appears to dépend on local 
management and union initiatives. 
Négociation collective, mutualité et participation 
des travailleurs à la gestion: analyse internationale 
Les efforts entrepris pour développer la participation des travailleurs à la ges-
tion ont principalement suivi deux voies. L'une, dont la négociation collective est un 
exemple, implique l'antagonisme; l'autre, représentée par les groupes de travail 
autonomes, la coopération des producteurs et (dans certaines limites) la cogestion, 
est de nature mutualiste ou consensuelle. Aux États-Unis et en Grande-Bretagne, 
c'est le modèle antagoniste que l'on trouve généralement dans les usines et les in-
dustries où les salariés sont syndiqués. Dans le système d'autogestion de la 
Yougoslavie, les kibboutz d'Israël et les coopératives de producteurs d'un certain 
nombre de pays, c'est le modèle mutualiste qui a été adopté. Mais on a aussi, en 
République fédérale d'Allemagne, en Suède et au Japon, des exemples de systèmes 
où les deux méthodes existent côte à côte dans la même industrie ou la même en-
treprise. Et il existe certaines manières de procéder qui combinent les conceptions an-
tagoniques et mutualistes. 
Bien que le système de négociation collective des États-Unis soit fondé sur l'an-
tagonisme, certains employeurs et syndicats ont évolué vers la méthode mutualiste en 
créant des commissions ou des programmes mixtes de coopération, dont les tâches 
sont ordinairement bien déterminées. Les résultats de la coopération dans le domaine 
du rendement de la production, de la réduction des coûts et de la lutte contre le 
gaspillage ont été minces. Dans la plupart des cas, les expériences faites aux États-
Unis en matière d'enrichissement et de valorisation des tâches ainsi qu'avec les 
groupes de travail semi-autonomes ont eu lieu dans des établissements dont le 
personnel n'était pas syndiqué. La méthode antagoniste permet théoriquement de 
régler à peu près tous les problèmes et questions relevant de la méthode mutualiste, 
mais les syndicats américains se sont bornés à diriger leurs efforts vers l'organisation 
rigoureuse et la réglementation des questions d'emploi. 
L'expérience de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, de la Suède et de quelques 
autres pays d'Europe montre bien que le champ de la négociation collective peut 
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s'étendre au-delà des questions classiques de salaires et de conditions d'emploi et 
être, en même temps, lié à des programmes mutualistes au lieu de travail et au conseil 
de direction. Les objectifs et les attitudes jouent un rôle capital dans ces cas. Il est 
significatif que le mutualisme soit souvent le résultat de l'action du pouvoir politique 
ou d'une redistribution de ce pouvoir dans l'ensemble de la société. Mais la volonté a 
aussi contribué dans une mesure capitale à donner leur physionomie aux relations 
professionnelles antagonistes et mutualistes 
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